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INTRODUCTION
Wendy and Henry Martin are white, upper-middle class profession-
als and have been married for seven years. They want to have a family,
but Wendy has been a diabetic since childhood, and her physician has
advised her that she faces severe medical problems if she has a baby.
Although she can become pregnant, Wendy cannot carry a child to term.
Henry and Wendy have considered their options. They contemplated
adoption, but they have heard that the wait for a healthy, white infant is
long. Moreover, they would prefer their own genetic child. Because
Wendy can produce healthy eggs and Henry can provide healthy sperm,
the Martins can produce a child from their genetic material as long as
they can find another woman to carry the fetus.
The Martins approach Gloria Simmons, a member of their church
whom they have known casually for several years. They became ac-
quainted with Gloria by working with her on various charitable and so-
cial projects sponsored by their church. Gloria works as an emergency
room nurse at a local hospital and is a single mother with three children.
Gloria is sympathetic to the plight of Wendy and Henry Martin. She
could also use some extra money. Consequently, Gloria agrees to gestate
the fetus conceived from the Martins' genetic material in exchange for
$10,000 plus pregnancy expenses. The Martins draw up a contract that
Gloria Simmons signs. The contract states that Gloria will relinquish
any and all parental rights at the birth of the child. The contract also
contains a liquidated damages clause for breach of any of the contract's
provisions.
The next step is to have Wendy's doctor stimulate her ovaries
through the use of drugs in order for her to produce more than one egg
in a cycle. At the same time, Gloria's menstrual cycle is manipulated
through hormones to coincide with Wendy's. At the appropriate time,
Wendy's eggs are surgically removed by puncturing the rear wall of her
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vagina and sucking the eggs from her ovary. These eggs are then fertil-
ized by Henry's sperm in a laboratory. Several fertilized eggs are then
transferred to Gloria's uterus, one of which is successfully implanted.
During the course of her pregnancy, Gloria takes medication that
causes a heart valve deformity in the after-born child.1 What is Gloria's
liability to the child? Despite the surrogate contract, should a tort action
on behalf of the child lie against Gloria if her actions result in an injury
to the child?
A variety of factors are emerging today that may make the above
scenario the prelude to a possible tort action on behalf of the child
against the woman who carried and gave birth to the child.2 The
hodgepodge of laws that is currently applied to these situations is likely
to create varying and unpredictable results. When dealing with gesta-
tional surrogate mother cases, some courts may look to family law and
parentage acts; others may apply straight tort doctrines.
Such problems are likely to increase rather than decrease because
new reproductive technologies are constantly being refined and used
more broadly to combat infertility. 3 Demand for these services will be
fueled by an increasing infertility rate4 and continued societal pressure on
couples to have babies of their "own." 5 Advances in our knowledge of
fetal development, new medical procedures used to treat fetuses in utero,
and the ongoing abortion controversy, have all directed attention toward
1. This example is merely illustrative of the many questions or disputes that may arise con-
cerning the management of a pregnancy.
2. Suits brought by the Martins against Gloria-for example, a pain and suffering claim re-
suiting from injury to or death of the fetus-may also be possible, but are beyond the scope of this
Note.
3. Infertility is usually defined as an inability to conceive after 12 months of unprotected inter-
course. Sophisticated new technologies to treat infertility include in vitro fertilization (PVF) and
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), which involve fertilization of the ova outside the uterus. Cry-
opreservation techniques allow IVF and GIFT to be applied on a larger scale. Other advances
include drug therapy, microsurgery, and laser surgery. For a more detailed description of these
procedures and other treatments of infertility, see UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 117-35 (1988) [hereinafter
INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES].
4. A survey by the National Center for Health Statistics found that in 1982, an estimated 2.4
million married couples in the United States in which the wife was between 15 and 44 years of age
were infertile. Id. at 50-51. This represents 13.9% of married couples (excluding surgically sterile
couples from the population base). See id. at 51. The incidence of primary infertility (childlessness)
doubled between 1965 and 1982; whereas the incidence of secondary infertility (inability of a couple
with at least one child to have more children) has decreased. Id. at 50. This decrease may be
explained by a dramatic increase in voluntary surgical sterilization. The most significant increase in
infertility between 1965 and 1982 occurred in 20 to 24 year olds, growing from 3.6% to 10.6%. This
may be explained by the increase in the gonorrhea rate in the age group, which tripled between 1960
and 1977. Id. at 50-52.
5. For information on the social and psychological impact of infertility, see id. at 37-38.
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the fetus and a new notion of state protection of fetal rights.6 Until the
ambiguities in the relationships and responsibilities of those involved in
the new baby-making technologies are resolved, more litigation will inev-
itably ensue.
Some knotty problems may arise when gestational surrogate
mothers are employed. 7 The gestational surrogate mother and the rear-
ing parents may have different priorities during the pregnancy. For ex-
ample, the rearing parents' main goal is likely to be centered solely on the
well-being of the fetus; whereas the surrogate mother may assign a higher
priority to her own health or other aspects of her life, including work or
other children she may have. When maternal-fetal conflicts arise in this
context and the child sustains injuries after birth, the rearing parents
have an incentive to sue the surrogate mother on behalf of the child. As
long as the surrogate mother has at least some money or property, recov-
ery of damages from her would help the rearing parents defray the costs
of caring for an injured child and compensate the child for her loss.
Although it is unclear whether actions may be brought against a
mother who is at the same time the genetic, gestational, and rearing par-
ent,8 the position of an injured child born to a surrogate mother is differ-
ent than that of a child born into a more traditional family. At least two
factors discourage a lawsuit on behalf of the child where the alleged
tortfeasor is also the rearing parent. First, the overall financial shape of
the family remains the same if a child recovers from a parent who is
6. Protection of fetuses has been most visible in recent years in the civil abuse context. See,
eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1991) (including children "determined to
be physically dependent upon an addictive drug at birth" within abuse statute); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4C-11 (West 1981) (protecting unborn through endangerment provisions); In re Troy D., 263
Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting child abuse and neglect statutes to cover ampheta-
mine and opiate use during pregnancy); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(finding abuse and neglect statutes include heroin use while pregnant); In re Stefanel Tyesha, 556
N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (interpreting statutes to include daily marijuana use while
pregnant), leave to appeal granted, 559 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); In re Fathima Ashanti
K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (interpreting statutes to include abuse to fetuses); Depart-
ment of Social Servs. ex rel Mark S. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Fam. Ct. 1989) (finding abuse
and neglect statues include cocaine use while pregnant); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fam. Ct.
1985) (including excessive drinking during pregnancy under child abuse and neglect statutes); In re
Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc.2d 31 (1986) (interpreting abuse and neglect statutes to include heroin use while
pregnant).
7. A gestational surrogate mother is genetically unrelated to the fetus she carries. The embryo
is usually from the egg and sperm of the intended rearing parents, but may be formed from donor
eggs and/or sperm. This differs from "traditional" surrogacy where a surrogate mother is artificially
inseminated with the sperm of the intended father and is the genetic as well as gestational mother of
the child. See INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, supra note 3, at 267.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 38-54.
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already raising and supporting her (unless liability insurance is in-
volved).9 Second, a married couple in a traditional family is not likely to
risk family discord by suing themselves or one another on behalf of their
child. These disincentives do not exist in the surrogate mother situation
in which the alleged tortfeasor is not a member of the family.
Whether surrogate contracts should be criminalized1° or made un-
enforceable 1 is beyond the scope of this Note. The status of breach of
contract issues that relate to prenatal injuries is connected to the issue of
enforceability and is also beyond the scope of this Note. However,
whether or not these arrangements remain legal,12 courts will need to
address the rights and responsibilities of the various parties in tort ac-
tions, independent of contract claims.
Part I of this Note examines the legal status of gestational surrogate
mothers as parents. New technologies are forcing society to define pa-
rental roles that had previously been considered too obvious to need legal
definition. Part I also addresses the allocation of rights and responsibili-
ties among parents, and advocates an expansive definition of motherhood
that includes gestational surrogate mothers during their pregnancies.
Part II examines the duty of care owed to a fetus by both traditional
mothers and gestational surrogate mothers. Part II then looks at the
history and the current legal status of the parental tort immunity doc-
trine and discusses its potential application to surrogate arrangements.
Part II concludes that parent-child tort immunity is too narrow a doc-
trine to protect adequately the rights of gestational surrogate mothers.
Part III of this Note proposes an alternative autonomy doctrine that
defines and limits the tort liability of gestational surrogate mothers. This
type of maternal autonomy gives the surrogate mother full responsibility
for her pregnancy that could only be overridden in the most egregious
circumstances. Such a policy avoids creating an adversarial situation be-
tween the parties. This Part specifically addresses medical decisions and
9. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
10. See, ag., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(l)(i) (West Supp. 1991) (defining paid surrogacy as a
third-degree felony); 81 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 18 (1981) ("Any contract or agreement involving surro-
gate parenthood is illegal under current Kentucky law.").
11. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-2 (Bums Supp. 1991) (voiding surrogate agreements);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991) (making surrogate agreements for valuable considera-
tion unenforceable); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988) (holding that surrogate mother
agreements are unenforceable).
12. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1) (Michie 1991) (acknowledging the woman giv-
ing birth to a child as the mother except in the case of a surrogate arrangement); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 127.287(5) (Michie Supp. 1989) (creating a lawful surrogate contract exception to adoption
law that prohibits paying for children).
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behavioral choices of the surrogate mother, including the use of ciga-
rettes, alcohol, and illegal drugs, and the mother's diet. This Note advo-
cates the use of a bright-line test, permitting tort actions only for prenatal
injuries to children that are the result of illegal behavior on the part of
the gestational surrogate mother. Under this test, children who are in-
jured by their gestational surrogate mother's criminal activities, such as
the prenatal use of controlled substances or drunk driving, may recover
for their injuries. This approach, however, prohibits recovery by chil-
dren who are injured as a result of conduct that might be considered
negligent or even reckless. This approach recognizes that the rights of
pregnant women should not be diminished by virtue of their pregnancy.
The bright-line nature of the rule is necessary to respect the integrity and
autonomy of all individuals (including pregnant ones), even though in
some cases the results of the test's application may seem harsh.
I. LEGAL STATUS OF GESTATIONAL SURROGATE MOTHERS
A. The Traditional View
The law has traditionally recognized only one mother and one fa-
ther for any given child.13 The presumption that the woman who gives
birth to a child is the mother has seemed so obvious that the law never
defined "maternity."1 4 Although this narrow definition may work rea-
sonably well when the same person is the genetic, gestational, and rearing
parent, as maternal roles become separable through the development of
technology, parental relationships are becoming more fluid.
The introduction of in vitro fertilization in the 1970s 5 paved the
way for gestational surrogacy. In 1985, the first reported gestational sur-
rogate mother in the United States gave birth.16 Although the legal sys-
tem has dealt with a number of traditional surrogacy cases, 17 few judges
have addressed gestational surrogacy. In two gestational surrogate cases
13. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 879
(1984).
14. See Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for Reproductive Tech-
nologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 187 n.1 (1986).
15. The first baby conceived through the use of in vitro fertilization was born in 1978. See Test-
Tube Baby Leaves Hospital, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1978, at A24.
16. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1012 n.246 (1986).
17. See, eg., In re R.K.S., 10 Famn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1383 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1984) (ordering
report on suitability of adoption before allowing adoption based on surrogacy agreement to proceed);
Miroff v. Surrogate Mother, 13 Fano. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1986) (declaring surro-
gate contracts contrary to public policy); Yates v. Keane, 14 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1987) (holding surrogacy agreement unenforceable); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)
(holding that surrogate contract violates state adoption laws).
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in which the parties were in complete agreement, judges granted pre-
birth orders identifying the genetic parents of the fetus as the legal par-
ents, and allowed the genetic parents to place their names on the chil-
dren's birth certificates. 18 In both cases, all parties involved sought and
consented to these orders to further their intentions regarding custody of
the child.' 9 One report stated, however, that "[t]he very need to resort to
a court order ... indicates that a de facto presumption exists that the
birth mother is the child's legal mother."20
One gestational surrogacy case has arisen in which the parties were
in conflict. In October of 1990, a California state judge wrestled with the
definition of motherhood in Johnson v. Calvert.21 In this case of first
impression, Anna Johnson, a gestational surrogate mother, sued the ge-
netic parents for custody of the baby boy to whom she gave birth.22 In
weighing the relative importance of genetics and gestation in the determi-
nation of motherhood, Judge Richard Parslow, Jr., came down soundly
on the side of genetics. The judge ruled that Anna Johnson had merely
acted as a foster mother for nine months and that "Anna's relationship
to the child is analogous to that of a foster parent providing care, protec-
tion, and nuture [sic] during the period of time that the natural mother,
Crispina Calvert, was unable to care for the child."'23 Judge Parslow
gave exclusive custody rights to the Calverts. "In essence, Anna has no
parental rights, contractually or not. I think a three-parent, two-natural
mom claim in a situation is ripe for crazy making .... -24
The implications of this decision are far-reaching. The status of
gamete and embryo donation,25 as well as of traditional surrogate ar-
rangements, is affected by such a restrictive definition of parenthood.
Following the Johnson logic, people who seek donation of genetic mate-
rial to have a baby would not be considered the parents of a child born
through these methods unless the donor (often anonymous) relinquished
18. See Smith v. Jones, No. CF 025653 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987); Smith v. Jones, No. 85-532014
DZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1986), cited in INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, sUpra
note 3, at 284 nn.62-63.
19. INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, supra note 3, at 290 nn.62-63.
20. Id
21. No. 63-31-90 (Cal. Super. CL Oct. 22, 1990).
22. In 1984, Crispina Calvert had a partial hysterectomy that left her capable of producing eggs
but unable to carry a child. In 1989, Crispina and Mark Calvert hired Anna Johnson, Crispina's co-
worker, to carry their genetic child. Andrea B. Eagan, Whose Life Is It, Anyway?, LEAR'S, Jan.
1991, at 120.
23. Calif Judge Speaks on Issue ofSurrogacy, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 36.
24. Id
25. Donor gametes are eggs or sperm donated for use in a medically assisted conception. Em-
bryo donation occurs when an embryo obtained by artificial insemination, lavage (washing out of the
uterus), or in vitro fertilization is transferred from one woman to another for gestation. See INFER-
TILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, supra note 3, at 384.
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all parental rights after the birth of the child, enabling the intended par-
ents to adopt the child. Allowing an anonymous sperm donor, for exam-
ple, to assert parental rights is a perversion of the donor system. At the
moment of birth, the donor has had no physical or emotional connection
to the child, unlike the mother who has supported the fetus for nine
months. This situation has been rectified in a number of states through
Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) statutes that grant parental
rights to the rearing parents as long as the donor is anonymous and the
insemination procedure has been performed by a licensed physician.26
Traditional surrogacy arrangements would also be affected by a genetic
definition of parenthood. This practice would be officially nonexistent
because the "surrogate mother" would always be recognized as the only
mother of the child. Judge Parslow's definition of parenthood based on
genetics is actually in conflict with California law based on the Uniform
Parentage Act,27 which states that the husband of a woman who gives
birth to a child as a result of in vitro fertilization with donor sperm is
considered the legal father unless the insemination was not performed by
a doctor.28 In these cases the genetic "father" is not considered a father
at all.
Although the Johnson case was a custody suit based on a contract
claim, its definition of parenthood has implications for tort law. If par-
entage is defined through genetics alone, a gestational surrogate mother
stands as a third party to the fetus she carries and may be liable in tort
for any injuries to the fetus that occur as a result of her behavior during
gestation.29 The parental tort immunity doctrine-or the exceptions to
tort liability for parents in states that do not recognize parental immu-
nity-may shield a gestational surrogate if she is considered a mother to
the child.30 This type of tort liability places fetal interests in conflict with
26. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1992);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (Vernon Supp. 1992); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30 -.38 (Baldwin
1991).
27. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).
28. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West 1983).
29. Many commentators advocate such liability for surrogate mothers. See John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405,
441 (1983) (calling for tort liability for women whose negligent conduct while pregnant causes harm
to child); Nancy Hansbrough, Note, Surrogate Motherhood and Tort Liability: Will the New Repro-
ductive Technologies Give Birth to a New Breed of Prenatal Tort?, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 311, 343
(1986) (advocating an enhanced standard of care for the "reasonably prudent expectant surrogate");
David E. Koropp, Note, Setting the Standard: A Mother's Duty During the Prenatal Period, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REv. 493, 512-13 (advocating gross negligence standard for liability of pregnant women).
30. See infra text accompanying note 73-81.
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the surrogate mother's interest in bodily integrity and places serious bur-
dens on her autonomy. 31
B. A Modern View
Under a more expansive definition of motherhood based upon the
physical and emotional connection between parent and child, the gesta-
tional surrogate mother is considered a parent during the pregnancy. 32
This definition recognizes that the nurturing and supportive role that the
surrogate mother fulfills during gestation is identical to the role that any
other mother plays 'during pregnancy. The surrogate mother is con-
nected to the fetus through a twenty-four-hour-a-day relationship and
contributes far more to the fetus than anyone else during this period,
including the couple who intends to rear the child in the future. Under a
modem definition of motherhood, the surrogate mother's active connec-
tion to the fetus should give her a higher priority than that afforded by
the passive genetic link held by the intended parents. The intended par-
ents may pay money that is used to provide food and medical care to
benefit the developing fetus, and they may also provide other physical
and emotional support for the gestational surrogate mother. This indi-
rect relationship with the fetus, however, should not trump the direct
connection that is shared by the gestational surrogate mother and the
fetus. Some commentators have suggested basing parental status on "re-
sponsibility and connection. '33
This modem view of parenthood is well-suited to the gestational
surrogacy context.34 Because the relationship between the fetus and the
31. See infra text accompanying notes 48-55.
32. The Johnson court is the only court to have addressed this issue in the gestational surrogate
mother context, and it refused to apply such a definition of motherhood. However, U.S. Supreme
Court precedents that base the rights of unwed fathers on their physical and emotional connection to
their children, rather than on a genetic tie, may be analogized to the connection between a gesta-
tional surrogate mother and the fetus she carries. In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that an unwed father had the right to block the adoption of his children because
the family lived together for several years and both parents cared for and supported the children.
"[A]n unwed father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the
mother." Id. at 389. Several years later, in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court held
that a putative father who never lived with, never supported, and rarely visited his child is not
entitled to notice of or an opportunity to be heard at the child's adoption proceeding. " 'Parental
rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They re-
quire relationships more enduring.'" Id. at 260 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at
397).
33. See Bartlett, supra note 13, at 893 (advocating a re-expression of parenthood that stresses
responsibility over rights).
34. Andrea Stumpf has proposed a legal matrix of motherhood that provides flexibility in the
allocation of parental rights and duties. This system divides the procreative process involving a
surrogate mother into four distinct stages. Stage three is the gestational stage, which begins with
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surrogate mother during gestation is the same as the relationship between
a fetus and a traditional mother, the surrogate mother should be treated
also as the "real" mother, at least during her pregnancy. 35 This classifi-
cation of mother would endow a surrogate with the same personal free-
dom enjoyed by any pregnant woman.36
The law must respond to the changes in technology, which, in turn,
change relationships, by creating new standards for determining and de-
fining parenthood. These new standards should recognize and accommo-
date societal changes by acknowledging more than one mother and one
father in the appropriate circumstances. 37 In situations in which several
people have filled what is usually considered a parental role and have
developed relationships with a child, courts should be flexible in recog-
nizing these relationships as parental ones.
II. PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Tort Liability of Mothers
Tort actions rest on duty of care, breach of duty, causation, and
damages .3  In cases in which fetal injuries occur and were caused by
maternal behavior, the ability to recover rests on finding a duty of care.
The few suits brought by children for prenatal injuries caused by their
mothers have only recently been heard.39 In a controversial decision, the
implantation and ends with birth. During this period the rights of the surrogate mother are domi-
nant. See Stumpf, supra note 14, at 193.
35. One commentator suggests the retention of the presumption that the birth (gestational)
mother is the legal mother for all purposes unless she relinquishes her parental rights. This pre-
sumption recognizes that a gestational mother has given more of herself to the child than the genetic
mother. See George J. Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New
Laws, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 50, 51.
36. Some intended rearing parents may claim that they relied on the gestational surrogate
mother to produce a healthy child. They may have signed a contract that explicitly spelled out the
duties of the parties, and limited the activities in which the surrogate mother may engage. Even if
the surrogate mother breached the contract, and the behavior that constituted the breach also in-
jured the child, this reliance on the contract would not create a tort claim on behalf of the child. The
intended parents may or may not have a contract claim, but this would be a separate question from
the claims of the child. Such a contract approach may lead to the "commodification" of children.
See George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 27, 30
(1988).
37. Contra Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) ("California law, like nature
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.").
38. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th
ed. 1984).
39. See, eg., Carpenter v. Bishop, 720 S.W.2d 299 (Ark. 1986) (denying recovery based on
parental tort immunity); Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988) (denying cause of ac-
tion for child for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing cause of action for child against mother for in utero injuries).
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Michigan Court of Appeals held in Grodin v. Grodin 40 that a child may
have a cause of action against her mother for injuries sustained while the
child was in utero.41 The court remanded the case for a determination of
the reasonableness of the mother's actions.42 Mrs. Grodin had taken tet-
racycline, which was prescribed by her doctor after she received assur-
ances from her doctor that it was impossible for her to become pregnant.
Mrs. Grodin consulted another doctor, who informed her that she was
seven or eight months pregnant, at which time she discontinued the use
of tetracycline. As a result of taking this medication while she was preg-
nant, Mrs. Grodin's son developed discolored teeth.43 The Grodin court
relied on Michigan's abrogation of the intrafamily tort immunity doc-
trine" in Plumley v. Klein,45 which created an exception to liability for
the exercise of reasonable parental discretion regarding basic provisions
such as medical care.46 The Grodin court thus held mothers to the same
liability standard as third parties concerning prenatal injuries.47
In contrast to Grodin, the Illinois Supreme Court in Stallman v.
Youngquist 4 held that no cause of action existed for a fetus, subse-
quently born alive, for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries.49 In
Stallman, a five month old fetus was injured in a car accident allegedly
because of the negligence of its mother. The court held that a ruling on
the applicability of the abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine was
unnecessary because the liability of a mother to her fetus was outside the
scope of the doctrine.50 The court criticized the Grodin court's applica-
tion of parental immunity, and that court's glossing over of the distinc-
tion between a child and a fetus. The court also criticized the Grodin
court for confusing the application of the partial abrogation of tort im-
munity with the creation of a new cause of action by a fetus, later born
alive, against its mother for prenatal injuries. "The Grodin court would
have the law treat a pregnant woman as a stranger to her developing
fetus for purposes of tort liability. The Grodin court failed to address
any of the profound implications which would result from such a legal
fiction and is, for that reason, unpersuasive."51
40. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
41. See i. at 870.
42. See id. at 871.
43. Id. at 869-70.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 91-101.
45. 199 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Mich. 1972).
46. See id. at 172-73.
47. See Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
48. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
49. See id
50. See id. at 356.
51. Id. at 358.
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The Stallman court recognized the fundamental difference between
prenatal injuries caused by third parties and those resulting from an act
or omission by the mother. The court stated that liability of third parties
furthered the interests of both mother and child, while not interfering
with the mother's right to control her own life.52 By contrast, "holding a
mother liable for the unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries subjects
to State scrutiny all the decisions a woman must make in attempting to
carry a pregnancy to term, and infringes on her right to privacy and
bodily autonomy."'53 While acknowledging the line of cases stating that
a fetus has a "legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body,"' 54 the
court refused to elevate the rights of fetuses above those of pregnant wo-
men by making the women guarantors of the health of their fetuses.5 5
The reasoning of Stallman applies equally to gestational surrogate
mothers. A gestational surrogate mother has the same connection with
the fetus as any other pregnant woman has during her pregnancy. Any
action on the mother's part, from the moment of implantation to birth,
may positively or negatively affect the fetus. Tort liability for actions
that are otherwise legal would severely diminish the autonomy of a wo-
man serving as a gestational surrogate mother.
Although the duty of care owed by a woman to her fetus may be
analogized to parent-child liability, the fundamental difference between a
child and fetus must be recognized. A child is an independent individual,
capable of asserting rights without diminishing those of her mother. The
fetus, on the other hand, cannot be endowed with the same rights with-
out necessarily subordinating the interests of its mother. Thus, if mater-
nal conduct injures a fetus, as opposed to a child, the imposition of the
duty on the mother is much greater. For example, providing nutrition to
a child does not impose upon the mother's own nutritional choices.
Although some real injuries may never be compensated, a general duty of
care of a mother to her fetus should not be recognized. Tort liability
would unduly burden a pregnant woman's rights of privacy, autonomy,
and bodily integrity - elevating the interests of fetuses above the rights
of women.
On its face, a general maternal duty would conflict with Roe v.
Wade,5 6 which held that a fetus is not a "person" under the Fourteenth
52. Id. at 360.
53. Id.
54. Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976) (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497,
503 (N.J. 1960)); see also Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971).
55. See Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Amendment,5 7 and that a woman's right to privacy outweighs an interest
in potential life-at least until the point of viability.5 8 Beyond viability, a
state interest in fetal life arises, but a fetus is not endowed with rights per
se. On the other hand, Roe may be viewed as pertaining only to the right
to abort a fetus. Once a woman "waives" that right by carrying the fetus
to term, she becomes liable for any injury not resulting in death. Yet,
this view of Roe glosses over the profound difference between a mother-
child relationship and a mother-fetus relationship. Adoption of this view
would unduly burden pregnant women by making them the guarantors
of fetal health. Gestational surrogate mothers have the same interests in
their autonomy as other pregnant women and should enjoy the same
protections.
B. Traditional Applications of Parent-Child Tort Immunity
If tort law were to recognize a duty of care for pregnant women, or
for surrogate mothers in particular, the doctrine of parent-child tort im-
munity would be significant in determining ultimate liability. Immunity
doctrine recognizes the commission of a tort, but excuses liability be-
cause of special circumstances, such as the existence of a parent-child
relationship.
The parental tort immunity doctrine was established in the United
States by a "great trilogy"5 9 of cases around the turn of the century. In
the first of these cases, Hewlette v. George,6° the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that a minor child could not recover compensatory damages
against the estate of her mother. The plaintiff had been wrongfully con-
fined in an insane asylum while under the care and control of her mother.
Although the Court acknowledged the child's injuries, it would not rec-
ognize a cause of action. Justice Woods wrote: "The peace of society,
and of the families composing society ... forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. 61
The issue of parental tort immunity was revisited twelve years later
in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 62 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court relied
extensively on the reasoning in Hewlette to deny the plaintiff a cause of
57. See id at 158.
58. See id at 163.
59. Hansbrough, supra note 29, at 321.
60. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
61. Id at 887.
62. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
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action against his father and stepmother for cruel and inhumane treat-
ment.63 The court also analogized parental tort immunity to husband-
wife immunity,64 even though spousal immunity can be distinguished be-
cause it is grounded in the common law notion of unity at marriage.65
Because a husband and wife were considered one entity until the Married
Women's Acts,66 a suit by one spouse against the other was the
equivalent of suing oneself.67 However, the parent-child relationship was
never defined in this way. In exchange for a duty to provide support, a
parent was given custody and control of a child. However, parents and
children were never considered an indivisible unit.68
The final case of the trilogy that fixed the doctrine of parental im-
munity was decided two years after McKelvey. In Roller v. Roller,69 the
Supreme Court of Washington reversed a $2000 compensatory award to
a minor child who had been raped by her father. Even though the father
had been convicted of rape and sent to prison, the court, relying on Hewl-
ette, refused to recognize any cause of action by a minor child for the
tortious conduct of her parent.70 This court also cited public policy rea-
sons for not allowing a claim:
The rule of law prohibiting suits between parent and child is based
upon the interest that society has in preserving harmony in the domes-
tic relations, an interest which has been manifested since the earliest
organization of civilized government, an interest inspired by the uni-
versally recognized fact that the maintenance of harmonious and
proper family relations is conducive to good citizenship, and therefore
works to the welfare of the state.71
The Roller court gave no weight to the argument that the rape of a
daughter by her father, and not the subsequent tort claim, was the cause
of family disharmony. 72
As courts began applying the parental tort immunity doctrine
throughout the United States, different rationales were given to support
these decisions. Along with the family harmony justification pronounced
in Hewlette, the Roller court also stated that the financial welfare of the
63. See id.
64. See iL at 665.
65. See Isabel Wingerter, Note, Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 50 LA. L. Rnv. 1131, 1134
(1990).
66. See William E. McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage of the
Matrimonial Home Owned By the Other, 2 VILL. L. REv. 447, 449 (1957).
67. See, eg., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614 (1910); Kelley v. Kelley, 153 A. 314,
315 (R.I. 1931). See generally KEETON, supra note 38, § 122, at 901-04.
68. See KEEToN, supra note 38, § 122, at 904.
69. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
70. See id. at 789.
71. Id. at 788.
72. See id, at 788-89.
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other minor children in the family cannot be compromised in favor of
one child in particular.73 The court was also concerned with the possibil-
ity that "the parent would become heir to the very property which had
been wrested by the law from him.'"'74 For example, a father ordered to
compensate his son for the father's tortious conduct would get that
money back should the son die intestate before he married or had chil-
dren of his own. Other courts addressed the problems of potential collu-
sion or fraud between parent and child, especially when the parent is
insured.75 Another justification was the need for parents to control and
discipline their children without fear of a lawsuit. 76
Over the years, the harshness of the rule was ameliorated in many
states through a variety of exceptions. Because the doctrine was
designed to protect family harmony, the dissolution of the family rela-
tionship made the doctrine inapplicable in some cases, including emanci-
pation of the minor,77 death of either party,78 temporary abandonment of
the child by the parent, 79 circumstances in which the child was not in the
custody and control of the parent when the tort occurred,80 and parental
abdication of parental responsibility. 1
73. See id. at 789.
74. Ide
75. See, e.g., Barlow v. Tolings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Iowa 1968).
76. See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (N.C. 1923) (holding that public policy consid-
erations "discourage causes of actions that tend to destroy parental authority and to undermine the
security of the home").
77. See, eg., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 288 P.2d 868, 873 (Cal. 1955) (stating that an
unemancipated child could not sustain a tort claim against her father); Weinberg v. Underwood, 244
A.2d 538, 539 (NJ. Super. 1968) ("[O]nce the child is legally emancipated the State has no strong
interest in maintaining the harmony of the family unit.").
78. See, e.g., Thurman v. Etherton, 459 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. 1970) ("The family status is
altered... when the parent dies, and the public policy considerations supporting the doctrine of
potential immunity are no longer controlling."); Logan v. Reaves, 354 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tenn.
1962).
79. Intentional or wanton injury to a child by a parent may constitute temporary abandonment.
See, eg., Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Ark. 1982) (finding that father's
drunk driving was wilful and wanton conduct for which a child can pursue an action against father's
estate); Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (Md. 1951) (permitting child to maintain an action
where father is guilty of acts that show complete abandonment of the parental relationship); Cowgill
v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (Or. 1950) (en bane) (allowing unemancipated minor to maintain an
action against parent for a wilful or malicious personal tort).
80. See, eg., Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711,712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to preclude
suit against noncustodial father arising from a dog attack); Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705,
706 (La. CL App. 1980) (finding no procedural bar to children's recovery against father where par-
ents were divorced and mother was awarded sole custody); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669
(Mo. 1979) (finding parent not immune from suit when she does not have primary, general custody
of minor).
81. See, eg., Hoffman v. Tracy 406 P.2d 323, 327 (Wash. 1965) (finding that mother who
drove drunk abdicated parental responsibility and can be sued by child).
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Courts have also looked to the type of activity that resulted in the
injury. Activities not central to the parent-child relationship were often
excepted from the doctrine. These exceptions include actions that arose
from negligent driving of a parent,8 2 from a breach of duty by the parent
owed to the general public, 3 and from an employment activity unrelated
to parental duties.84
Some courts have viewed liability insurance as a factor that would
make the immunity doctrine inapplicable rather than as a justification for
the doctrine.85 Courts have reasoned that family harmony would not be
disrupted nor would family funds be depleted if the claim is paid by a
third party, such as an insurance company.86 Courts have also made an
exception for third parties who seek contribution from a parent whose
negligence contributed to the child's injury. 87 In addition, immunity
may be held inapplicable to some statutory causes of action.88
C. Modern Treatment of Immunity
The previous section shows that for over seventy years courts ap-
plied the parental tort immunity doctrine while continually chipping
away at it. In 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated the doc-
trine in Goller v. White.8 9 In that case, the court held that a foster father
was liable to a boy in his care for injuries that resulted from a tractor
accident. However, the court did carve out exceptions to the abrogation.
82. See, eg., Ooms v. Ooms, 316 A.2d 783 (Conn. 1972) (finding statutory abrogation in motor
vehicle negligence actions); Unah ex reL Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Okla. 1984) ("Paren-
tal immunity in vehicular negligence cases has no rational basis under present circumstances."). But
see Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986) (holding that any exceptions for vehicular negligence
must come from legislature).
83. See eg., Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
child, hit by car because of driver's obstruction of view, has cause of action against mother who
failed to keep trees trimmed); Grivas v. Grivas, 496 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760-61 (App. Div. 1985) (finding
that mother who left lawnmower unattended and running could be sued by anyone harmed, includ-
ing child, but holding mother's failure to instruct child on lawnmower usage not actionable).
84. See, eg., Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952) (allowing child to
maintain a cause of action against father and his partner for injuries resulting from negligent mainte-
nance of a gasoline pump used for partnership business); Borst v. Borst, 251 P.2d 149, 156 (Wash.
1952) (en banc) (holding that a child injured by parent's reckless truck driving was in the course of
employment, therefore, child could maintain suit); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933
(Tex. 1971).
85. See, eg., Rousey v. Rousey, 499 A.2d 1199, 1202 (D.C. App. 1985); Sorenson v. Sorenson,
339 N.E.2d 907, 914-15 (Mass. 1975). But see Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 177 So. 133, 136
(Ala. 1937).
86. See, eg., Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d at 914; Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966).
87. See, eg., Walker v. Milton, 268 So. 2d 654 (La. 1972); Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement Corp.,
378 N.Y.S.2d 417 (App. Div. 1976).
88. See, eg., Ooms v. Ooms, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (Conn. 1972); Thelen v. Thelen, 435 N.W.2d
495, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
89. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
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A parent would still be immune from tort liability in two instances: "(1)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority
over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exer-
cise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food,
clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." 90
Although the trend has been toward either partial or total abroga-
tion of the parental tort immunity doctrine, many states still retain the
doctrine. 91 There is a great deal of variety among the states that have
recognized abrogation. California, for example, in Gibson v. Gibson,92
constructed a "reasonably prudent parent" standard recognizing that
"traditional concepts of negligence cannot be blindly applied."' 93 All
states have carved out areas in which a parent is still immune from tort
liability. These areas range from negligent supervision, 94 to negligent en-
trustment of a dangerous instrumentality,95 to exercise of parental au-
thority.96 The scope of the immunity or the abrogation differs in each
jurisdiction.97
In many states the immunity doctrine and the exceptions to its abro-
gation have applied to those who stand in loco parentis98 as well as to
actual parents. In a recent Michigan case, Thelen v. Thelen,99 a steppar-
ent standing in loco parentis was permitted to assert the defense of paren-
tal immunity where a child was injured by a dog bite.'0°
90. Id at 198.
91. As of 1988, 17 states retained the parental tort immunity doctrine. KEETON, supra note 38,
§ 122, at 907.
92. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
93. Id. at 652.
94. See, eg., Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974) (supervising children at play is
discretionary and not actionable). Contra Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 201
N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1972) (giving child who, left alone in house, wandered off and was hit by truck,
cause of action against parents).
95. See, eg., Nolechek v. Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1271-72 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that en-
trusting a minor with a dangerous instrument is a discretionary decision within a parent's right),
modified, Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 447 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1983). Contra Howes v. Hansen, 201
N.W.2d 825, 832 (Wis. 1972) (finding a cause of action since parent's negligent supervision is not an
exception to the abrogation of parental immunity); Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky. 1982)
(holding that a father who allowed his son to ride an unlicensed motorbike is not entitled to parental
immunity).
96. SeA eg., Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 A.2d 442, 445 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978); Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360, 362 (Okla. 1984).
97. See generally KEETON, supra note 38, § 122, at 907; Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immu-
nity: A Doctrine in Search of a Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 528-32 (1982).
98. Those who act in loco parents assume the role usually filled by a parent.
99. 435 N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
100. See id. at 496; see also Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(immunizing grandmother acting in loco parentis from suit based on negligent supervision).
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The questions arise whether children and fetuses are fundamentally
different, and whether parent-child tort immunity doctrine and its abro-
gation apply to pregnant women and their fetuses. This doctrine may
apply to gestational surrogate mothers while they are pregnant, whether
they are viewed as parents, or, as Judge Parslow defined surrogate
mothers in Johnson v. Calvert, as "foster parents."''1 1 Since 1946, the
right of children later born alive to recover for prenatal injuries caused
by the negligence of third parties has become firmly established. 10 2
The future of the parental tort immunity doctrine is uncertain, and
its focus is too narrow to protect adequately the rights of gestational sur-
rogate mothers. Even if a surrogate mother's role as a parent is recog-
nized, courts may be reluctant to apply such a doctrine in surrogate
mother cases because none of the traditional rationales makes sense in a
situation where the birth mother and the rearing mother are two different
people. Because the child is being raised in another family, disruption of
family harmony, collusion, and depletion of family assets would be irrele-
vant concerns. Only a formalistic application of the immunity doctrine
would protect a surrogate mother from tort liability for prenatal injuries.
A pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity and autonomy must rest on
a broader liberty interest than the parent-child tort immunity doctrine-
especially because the trend in many jurisdictions is toward abrogation of
or restrictions on this type of immunity. Therefore, parental tort immu-
nity may be a precarious doctrine on which to rest the rights of pregnant
women, especially gestational surrogates.
III. AUTONOMY AND THE LIMrrS OF LIABILITY
As the court in Stallman v. Youngquist 10 3 noted, the recognition of
a cause of action by a child against its mother for prenatal injuries would
interfere with the mother's autonomy.'°4 Interests concerning autonomy
and bodily integrity are also implicated in the cases that involve gesta-
tional surrogate mothers despite the existence of a contract that purports
to circumscribe the autonomy rights of the gestational surrogate mother.
The bodily integrity of women falls within a category of social interaction
that should be inalienable within the marketplace. Professor Radin has
offered a theory of market-inalienabilities that rests on the principle that
some activities and things should not be traded in the marketplace.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
102. See, eg., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (allowing viable fetus later born
alive to recover for prenatal injuries). This position was rapidly adopted in all American jurisdic-
tions. See KEETON, supra note 38, § 55, at 368.
103. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
104. See Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 358-59.
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Items are determined to be inalienable if they are central to our concepts
of personhood and human flourishing.105 This theory rejects the trans-
formation of people into commodities and attaches market-inalienability
to attributes and things that form "our understanding of identity and
contextuality."' 0 6 Bodily integrity is such an attribute:
Bodily integrity is an attribute and not an object. We feel discomfort
or even insult, and we fear degradation or even loss of the value in-
volved, when bodily integrity is conceived of as a fungible object ....
Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is
threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person that
which is integral to the person.' 0 7
Professor Radin examines surrogacy in light of this concept of
human flourishing and advocates the noncommodification of surro-
gacy.1°0 In a utopian world, all surrogacy would be inalienable because
of the harm to our self-conception caused by the commodification of wo-
men's reproductive capacities and children. As a transitional stage in the
real world, unpaid surrogacy would be permitted to fulfill the needs of
those who feel that genetic offspring are necessary to be complete, as well
as to fulfill the altruistic motives of some surrogate mothers. "To try to
create an ideal world all at once would do violence to things people make
central to themselves."''0 9
Although Radin believes that the best solution in an non-ideal world
is to permit unpaid surrogacy while not allowing paid surrogacy, she ac-
knowledges the "double bind" that results from conditions in our non-
ideal world.110 By creating inalienable rights of autonomy, other rights
are taken away (e.g., the right to contract freely):
[T]here is the possibility of even further oppression of poor or ignorant
women, which must be weighed against a possible step toward their
liberation through economic gain from a new alienable entitlement-
the double bind .... The availability of the surrogacy option could
create hard choices for poor women .... It might be degrading for the
surrogate to commodify her gestational services or her baby, but she
might find this preferable to her other choices in life. 11
Ultimately, Radin finds the market inalienability of surrogacy pref-
erable to complete or partial commodification because of the "risk [of]
105. See Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1903 (1987); see
also Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
106. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 105, at 1906.
107. Id at 1880-81.
108. See id at 1921.
109. Id at 1932.
110. See id at 1930.
111. Id
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conceiving of all women's personal attributes in market rhetoric, and be-
cause paid surrogacy within the current gender structure may symbolize
that women are fungible babymakers ... "112
The theory of human flourishing that permeates Radin's work is rel-
evant to the creation of a duty of care in the tort context. However,
although protection of the bodily integrity rights of a surrogate mother
necessarily limits her freedom to contract and produces the "double
bind," this problem does not exist in the tort situation. State coercion
through the imposition of a duty of care (not a contract to which the
surrogate mother was a willing party) circumscribes the surrogate
mother's autonomy.
A. Medical Decisions
Pregnant women face many medical decisions throughout their
pregnancies that are left to the individual pregnant woman. The same
choices should "be left to gestational surrogate mothers because these
mothers have the same stake in their bodily integrity as other pregnant
women. The fact that a woman is genetically unrelated to the fetus she is
carrying and does not intend to raise the child is an inadequate reason for
delegating the right to make health care decisions to the contracting par-
ents, health care professionals, or the courts. After-the-fact tort liability
stemming from prenatal medical decisions would impose too great a bur-
den on those choices and would effectively limit a woman's ability to
make her own health care decisions.
1. Abortion. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a wo-
man's constitutional right to have an abortion prior to the viability of the
fetus.113 Surrogacy contracts typically contain clauses that shift the
abortion decision from the surrogate mother to the intended rearing par-
ents.114 These provisions usually delineate the choice to abort and the
choice not to abort.115
Recall the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note. Suppose that
Gloria Simmons, the gestational surrogate mother, is now ten weeks into
her pregnancy. Henry and Wendy have decided that they no longer
want to stay together after seven years of marriage, and they certainly do
not want a baby to complicate their situation. Can the Martins force
112. Id at 1935.
113. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. Thomas W. Mayo, Medical Decision Making During a Surrogate Pregnancy, 25 Hous. L.
REv. 599, 609-10 (1988).
115. Id. at 610.
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Gloria to have an abortion? If Gloria refuses, is she liable to the Martins
or to the subsequently born child?
Although an abortion decision like Gloria's was not at issue in the
Baby M case,' 16 the New Jersey Supreme Court nevertheless said in dicta
that such provisions would violate the constitutional right of abortion or
procreation. 1 7 It is unimaginable that specific performance ordering a
woman to undergo or not to undergo an abortion would be ordered by a
court. However, the award of money damages is an unresolved issue.
Professor Mayo analogizes this abortion scenario with the racial discrim-
ination cases of Shelley v. Kraemer" 8 and Barrows v. Jackson.119 In
Shelley, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a racially restrictive cove-
nant on property. Court enforcement of a private agreement that dis-
criminated on the basis of race would be state action that violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 120 In Barrows, the court refused to award dam-
ages for breach of a racially restrictive covenant using the same reasoning
that it used in Shelley.' 2' Professor Mayo asserts: "If the analogy be-
tween state ordered racial discrimination and active state interference
with first trimester abortions is accepted, the logic of Barrows is clear:
with respect to abortions, as with racial discrimination, a state may not
penalize conduct that it lacks the power to forbid.1' 22
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,123 the Supreme Court struck
down a statute that would have required women to get spousal consent to
obtain an abortion. The Court held that the state could not delegate a
right that the state itself did not have.124 Shelley, Barrows, Roe, and
Danforth, taken together, suggest that a gestational surrogate's right to
choose whether or not to have an abortion would be unduly burdened by
the potential of civil liability that might stem from that decision. "The
Shelley-Barrows-Roe-Danforth line of cases does accomplish one thing:
It demonstrates that, in the absence of a contract (or, if the surrogate
mother is unable to contract away her abortion rights), the state probably
lacks the power to award damages to the biological father in tort."' 25
116. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
117. Almost all commentary on the subject is in agreement with the New Jersey Court. See
Mayo, supra note 114, at 611.
118. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
unconstitutional).
119. 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (voiding an award of monetary damages against a property owner who
breached a racial covenant as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment).
120. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
121. See Barrows, 346 U.S. at 254.
122. Mayo, supra note 114, at 617.
123. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
124. See id. at 69.
125. Mayo, supra note 114, at 618 n.75.
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The child born to Gloria Simmons would also be without a cause of
action. Courts have always considered a child better off being born
rather than being aborted. 126
2. Other Medical Decisions. A variety of medical care decisions
(other than the abortion decision) that arise during pregnancy may affect
the health of both mother and fetus. An individual's right to refuse med-
ical treatment is a firmly established tenet of American law: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages."1 27 The rights of gestational surrogate mothers in
managing their pregnancies are complicated by the interests of the fetus,
the biological parents, and the state.
Suppose that Gloria Simmons goes into labor, and while she is con-
nected to a fetal monitor, the doctor notices that the fetal heartbeat has
decelerated. The doctor suggests that Gloria deliver by cesarean section
because the fetus may be in distress. Should Gloria, faced with an inva-
sive surgical procedure, be permitted to choose which course to follow?
If she refuses to consent to the cesarean, will the after-born child have a
cause of action in tort if the child sustains injuries due to Gloria's elec-
tion of a vaginal delivery?
Some commentators have suggested that these decisions, including
regular doctor visits, pregnancy-related diagnosis and treatment, aqd ad-
herence to doctor's orders, should be made by the biological parents be-
cause they are the "real" parents.' 28 However, these commentators
neglect to take into account the interests of the gestational surrogate
mother in her bodily integrity. At the point in which the only contribu-
tion of the intended rearing parents is their genetic material and financial
support, the mother's rights should override these interests.1 29 The
health and lifestyle of the surrogate mother are gravely affected by a
pregnancy. Therefore, a gestational surrogate mother must have all the
rights of any other pregnant woman in making medical decisions.
Some courts have overridden a pregnant woman's right to refuse
particular medical treatments to protect the life and health of the fetus.
126. See, eg., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (NJ. 1967) ("The infant plaintiff would
have us measure the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence,
but it is impossible to make such a determination.").
127. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
128. See, eg., John J. Mandler, Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family'" A Proposed
Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1312 (1985).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
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Although the medical profession traditionally treated the pregnant wo-
man and her fetus as one patient, advances in our knowledge of environ-
mental effects and maternal conduct on fetuses have led to a new concept
of the fetus as a separate and distinct patient.130 Increased ability to treat
fetuses before birth has also inspired the fetal rights movement.1 31 This
concept of the fetus as a patient has led to state intervention in the man-
agement of individual pregnancies. Intervention has been most prevalent
in the area of judicially ordered, forced cesarean sections. 132 Although a
number of lower courts have ordered this invasive procedure, 133 only two
appellate decisions have been reported.1 34 In the more recent decision,
In re A. C., 135 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that "in
virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be decided by
the patient-the pregnant woman-on behalf of herself and the fetus."1 36
In this unusual case, a terminally ill pregnant woman was forced to un-
dergo a cesarean section against her wishes to attempt to save the life of
her twenty-six week old fetus. The mother wanted to try to stay alive
until the twenty-eighth week when the fetus would have a much better
chance of survival. She had previously agreed to submit to a cesarean
section when the fetus reached that level of maturity. As her condition
worsened, the hospital requested a declaratory judgment from the trial
130. See Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. Rav.
1519, 1556 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Technology and the Law].
131. See IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 1152 (2d ed. 1991); William Ruddick & Wil-
liam Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1982, at 10.
132. Forced cesarean sections have been very controversial and have spawned reams of commen-
tary. See, eg., George J. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16; Martha A. Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (1989); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions:
What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987); Jeanne Guillemin, Babies By
Cesarean: Who Choose% Who Controls?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1981, at 15; Dawn E. John-
sen, The Creation of Fetal Rights" Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy,
and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treat-
ment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
703 (1986); Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and By What Stan.
dards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 505 (1989); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood
Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1325 (1990).
133. A national survey in the 1980s reported that over a five-year period, 21 court orders had
been sought to compel treatment of pregnant women. Of these, 15 were for cesarean sections, 13 of
which were granted. Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1192-93 (1987); see also Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy:
Whose Decision Is ItAnyway?, 41 RuTGEpls L. REv. 591, 609 n.135 (1989) (citing 12 cases of com-
pelled cesarean sections).
134. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam)
(denying motion to stay court-ordered cesarean); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990) (en
banc).
135. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990) (en banc).
136. Id. at 1237.
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court. The court ordered a cesarean section to be performed, and a
three-judge motions division denied a stay of the order. The surgery was
performed, and both mother and child died.13 7 The en bane court re-
versed, citing the principle of informed consent, which, "rooted in the
concept of bodily integrity, is ingrained in our common law."' 38 The
court also noted the common law rule that a person has no duty to rescue
another.139
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
has also recognized the importance of allowing pregnant women to make
their own medical choices:
Obstetricians should refrain from performing procedures that are
unwanted by a pregnant woman. The use of judicial authority to
implement treatment regimens in order to protect the fetus violates
the pregnant woman's autonomy. Furthermore, inappropriate reli-
ance on judicial authority may lead to undesirable social consequences,
such as the criminalization of noncompliance with medical
recommendations. 140
Fetal rights advocates disagree. They contend that once a woman
"waives" her right to an abortion by choosing to carry the fetus to term,
she has the responsibility of assuring the health of the child.14  Prefer-
ence for fetal rights over maternal rights is often justified by analogy to
tort law cases in which third parties are involved.1 42 In the 1946 case of
Bonbrest v. Kotz,' 43 a court, for the first time, allowed recovery for rea-
sonably foreseeable prenatal injuries to a child subsequently born alive.
All American jurisdictions now recognize such a cause of action. How-
ever, the only court ever to apply this tort doctrine to a mother rather
than a third party was the Grodin court. 44 Some commentators support
the Grodin position. For example, Professor Robertson contends that a
"viable fetus acquires rights to have the mother conduct her life in ways
that will not injure it."'14 5 These rights can be asserted by forced medical
intervention or after-the-fact tort liability.
Forced medical procedures, or other coercive methods to insure
benefits to another, have been implemented only in the pregnancy con-
text. In these cases, the rights of a fetus have been elevated over those of
137. Id.
138. IM at 1243.
139. See ia at 1244.
140. Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict, ACOG Comm. Op. No. 55 (1987), quoted in ELL-
MAN, supra note 131, at 1152.
141. See Robertson, supra note 132, at 450.
142. See id. at 439.
143. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
144. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
145. Robertson, supra note 132, at 438.
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the already born. For example, in November 1990, the Illinois Supreme
Court refused to order tests on healthy twin boys to determine their suit-
ability as bone marrow donors for their thirteen year old half-brother
over the objections of their mother. 146 The thirteen year old died of leu-
kemia because he was unable to get a bone marrow transplant. 147 In
McFall v. Shimp, 148 the cousin of a fatally ill man was the only known
compatible bone marrow donor. Yet, a Pennsylvania judge, while find-
ing the cousin's behavior repugnant, refused to order the cousin to un-
dergo the bone marrow donation procedure. "For a society.., to sink
its teeth into the.., neck of one of its members and suck from it suste-
nance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of
jurisprudence."1 49 These courts have rested their decisions on the com-
mon law principle that there is no legal duty to rescue.1 50
A recent appellate court decision in New York that allowed a
mother to refuse a blood transfusion was upheld by New York's highest
court.15' The state argued that the woman should be forced to submit to
the transfusion on behalf of her newborn because the mother's death
would constitute parental abandonment. 152 The appellate court elimi-
nated this factor from consideration, holding that the right to refuse
treatment is virtually absolute and should not be balanced against other
considerations. 153
Forcing pregnant women to undergo invasive medical procedures or
face civil liability elevates medical "advice" to the level of legally enforce-
able orders. Although modern obstetrics/gynecology professionals have
made important contributions to maternal and fetal health, the health
care profession has also been responsible for prescribing drugs like
DES154 and thalidomide 55 to pregnant women. Iatrogenic 56 medicine
146. See Boy at Center of Suit for a Marrow Donor Is Dead of Leukemia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1990, at B9.
147. Id.
148. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
149. Id, at 92; see also In re Application of George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (refus-
ing to force putative father to undergo a blood test to aid son with leukemia).
150. Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 130, at 1570.
151. See Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990), affg 536 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989).
152. Id. at 83.
153. See id. at 84.
154. DES (Diethylstilbestrol) was prescribed to pregnant women as an anti-miscarriage drug in
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s even though its effectiveness was unproven. Daughters born to women
who had taken DES while pregnant have an unusually high rate of vaginal cancer. Even after the
medical community became aware of the problems with DES in the 1970s, the drug was used experi-
mentally as a "morning-after" pill on young women who were unaware of its dangers. GINA
COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE TREATS WOMEN AS PATIENTS
AND PROFESSIONALS 242-52 (1977).
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remains a significant problem, and women must be allowed to assess the
advantages and risks of treatment, and decide for themselves which risks
they are willing to take.
Some forms of doctor's advice do not entail direct invasion of the
body of a pregnant woman, but do impact her lifestyle choices. For in-
stance, suppose our hypothetical gestational surrogate mother, Gloria, is
in her sixth month of pregnancy and has been told by her doctor that she
is suffering from severe preeclampsia.15 7 Because this condition often
leads to premature labor and increased morbidity and mortality of
newborns, 158 the doctor, with the support of Wendy and Henry, has or-
dered Gloria to spend the remainder of her pregnancy in bed. Gloria,
who has three other children, refuses to give up her nursing position be-
cause she needs the money to support her family. If the baby that Gloria
is carrying is born prematurely and suffers lung problems as a result,
should the child be able to recover from Gloria in a tort action?
Limiting Gloria's activities, especially employment, places an undue
burden on her autonomy. Such a duty of care to a fetus places the fetus's
interests above those of the mother and her existing children.
Although fetal health is a legitimate concern, it is outweighed by a
woman's fundamental right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
A mother's medical care choices may produce tragic results in a given
case. However, the cost to society of preventing such tragedies would be
the subjugation of individuals to an unbounded tyranny of technology
and medical science. 159 The same policy considerations and fundamental
rights that are at stake for mothers in general also apply to gestational
surrogate mothers during their pregnancies. The genetic link to a fetus is
not what creates autonomy rights in a mother; a gestational surrogate
has as compelling an interest in her bodily integrity as any other mother.
Tort liability for making the "wrong" medical decision would place too
155. Thalidomide was widely prescribed to pregnant women in many countries as an anti-nausea
drug in 1960-1961. The drug was distributed for investigational use in the United States. The effects
of thalidomide on fetuses were tragic. Thalidomide babies were born with limbs that were reduced
or nonexistent, as well as a range of other birth defects. One dosage was enough to cause gross
abnormalities. Before the drug was discontinued, thalidomide produced thousands of victims. Max
Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide:. A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.L 458-61 (1986).
156. latrogenic illness is "an alteration in the state of health of a patient during the course of
medical treatment... which is the result of the procedure rather than any underlying disease or
illness." William R. Anderson, latrogenic Death and Injury, TRAUMA, Aug. 1987, at 9, 10.
157. Preeclampsia is pregnancy-induced hypertension that results from spasm of the end arter-
ies. See John L. Duhring, Nutritional Requirements of Pregnancy, in PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH,
AND PARENTHOOD 50 (Paul Ahmed ed., 1981).
158. Id. at 50-51.
159. Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 130, at 1572.
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great a burden on the gestational surrogate mother and would, in effect,
make the exercise of free choice impossible.
B. Nutrition, Alcohol, and Tobacco
Prenatal care is extremely important to the health of a fetus.
Among the most vital aspects of prenatal health is the quality of nutri-
tional intake.160 Naturally, a fetus only receives what its mother ingests.
A poor maternal diet may result in a number of health problems for the
newborn.1 61 Vitamin and mineral deficiencies,1 62 as well as excess inges-
tion of certain vitamins, can cause a range of serious medical
conditions.163
At least one judge has recognized the importance of nutrition in
pregnancy and tried to burden the fundamental procreation right of a
defendant to prevent potential harm to a fetus. 64 In People v. Pointer,
the trial judge was faced with a defendant who was a strict adherent to a
macrobiotic diet165 regime. She was convicted of child endangerment be-
cause she kept her small children on the same diet. The judge imposed a
restriction on her probation that she not conceive another child because
of potential danger to a fetus in utero. The appellate court reversed,
holding that such a burden was unconstitutional and would be coercive
of abortion.166 However, the appellate court did leave open the door for
forced prenatal care as a less burdensome alternative. 167
Not surprisingly, in the context of the gestational surrogacy, some
intended rearing parents would like to control the nutritional intake of
the gestational surrogate mother. However, this type of control, either
directly or through after-the-fact tort liability, implicates the same funda-
mental rights as coercive medical care. Making a pregnant woman re-
sponsible for every morsel she eats or fails to eat is not only impractical,
160. Duhring, supra note 157, at 40-41.
161. Inadequate diet may cause reduced brain weight, smaller head circumference, impairment
of fetal brain development, prematurity, and permanent mental deficiency. Hansbrough, supra note
29, at 331.
162. Iodine deficiency can cause goiter or cretinism. Lack of vitamin D or calcium may cause
rickets. Lack of vitamin A can cause underdeveloped major organs and other defects.
Hydrocephaly, which in turn causes retardation, results from deprivation of vitamin B12. Ribofla-
vin deficiency may cause malocclusion of the jaws and teeth and possibly a cleft palate. Id. at 332.
163. Excess ingestion of fat-soluble vitamins, especially A and D, may cause congenital malfor-
mations in newborns. Duhring, supra note 157, at 43.
164. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
165. A macrobiotic diet consists mainly of vegetables and grains. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC
UNABRIDGED DICONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 860 (1989).
166. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
167. See id. at 366.
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but relegates the woman to the role of fetal container whose sole respon-
sibility is to produce the perfect baby.
The most persuasive argument for limiting a pregnant woman's
right of self-determination is in the area of alcohol and tobacco use be-
cause they are inherently dangerous substances that harm adults as well
as fetuses. However, as long as these products remain legal in the United
States, monitoring their use by pregnant women would constitute a
greater harm. Regulating maternal behavior in an otherwise legal pur-
suit would justify regulation of and civil liability for any maternal activ-
ity that may affect fetal health.
The effects on fetuses of moderate alcohol consumption during preg-
nancy are widely disputed in the medical community. 168 However,
heavy alcohol consumption during pregnancy is known to have serious
and lasting effects on the health of newborns, including physical abnor-
malities, retarded growth, and developmental delay. 169 Excessive drink-
ing often results in a child born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS). 17 0
Tobacco is also known to have deleterious effects on fetuses. The
nicotine that a pregnant woman inhales crosses the placenta, and the fe-
tus may develop a nicotine dependence. 171 The most common medical
problems associated with newborns of smokers are prematurity, growth
retardation, and low birth weight. 172 Although alcohol and tobacco can
cause serious health problems for fetuses as well as adults, their use re-
mains legal in the United States.
Even though alcohol consumption is legal, driving while under the
influence of alcohol is not. Because drunk driving is an illegal activity,
tort liability stemming from this activity would not impose on a pregnant
woman's autonomy. She is not free to drive under the influence of alco-
hol, so recovery by an injured child cannot be a burden in a choice she is
not otherwise free to make. Therefore, a child should be able to recover
from her mother for prenatal injuries caused by the mother's drunk
driving.
168. See Field, supra note 132, at 119 n.45.
169. Hansbrough, supra note 29, at 332-33.
170. Health problems associated with FAS include prenatal and postnatal growth retardation,
cardiac defects, craniofacial deformities, impaired joint mobility, central nervous system abnormali-
ties, and microencephaly with mental retardation. Field, supra note 132, at 119.
171. David W. Martin, Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Pregnancy: Information for Patients, in
PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND PARENTHOOD, supra note 157, at 139, 142.
172. Hansbrough, supra note 29, at 333.
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C. Illegal Drugs
Suppose that Gloria Simmons is progressing in her surrogate preg-
nancy, but she habitually smokes crack. Should she be liable to the fetus
she is carrying if the child is born with injuries due to crack use? Liabil-
ity stemming from injury caused by illegal activity is inherently different
than liability of gestational surrogate mothers arising from a legal activ-
ity. The specter of tort liability may restrict pregnant women, in general,
and gestational surrogate mothers, in particular, from making choices
that we regularly allow others to make. However, because we prohibit
all people from using certain drugs, imposing tort liability for injuries
caused by the ingestion of controlled substances does not impose on a
pregnant woman's autonomy. Regardless of the tort possibilities, smok-
ing crack is not a choice that Gloria is otherwise free to make.
The use of illegal drugs by pregnant women is becoming a wide-
spread problem173 and can have devastating effects on fetuses.1 74 Com-
mentators have written extensively about maternal drug use, offering a
variety of solutions, including better treatment for maternal abusers175
and greater regulation of pregnant women.176
173. See Kristen R. Lichtenberg, Comment, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Callfora Thought-
ful Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 379 n.17 (1990) ("In the United States in 1989,
375,000 infants will have been exposed prenatally to illegal drugs.").
174. For example, use of cocaine, especially in its potent "crack" form, during gestation may
cause oxygen deprivation or malformations of the urogenital, cardiac, and central nervous systems.
Fetuses exposed to crack are also at risk of having strokes at birth, which can lead to brain damage.
Cocaine can cause permanent neurological problems that affect motor skills, reflexes, and coordina-
tion. Fetuses exposed to cocaine usually have lower birth weights and smaller head circumferences
than other babies. Id. at 379-80; see also Janet R. Fink, Effects of Crack and Cocaine on Infants: A
Brief Review of the Literature, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 460 (Spec. Issue 1990).
175. Many commentators have advocated increased treatment programs to combat gestational
drug abuse rather than criminal or civil sanctions. See, eg., George J. Annas, Pregnant Women as
Fetal Containers, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1986, at 13; Dawn E. Johnsen, From Driving to
Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's LivesAfter Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179
(1989); Thomas B. Mackenzie et al., Case Studies: When a Pregnant Woman Endangers Her Fetus,
HASTiNGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1986, at 24; Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 278 (1990); Emily M. Dargatz, Note, Legal Representation of a Fetus: The
Mother and Child Disunion?, 18 CAP. U. L. REv. 591 (1989); Judith Kahn, Note, Of Woman's First
Disobedience" Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her Fetus-Is this a Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
807 (1987); Rebecca Manson & Judy Marolt, Comment, A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State Interven-
tion to Protect the Unborn-Protection at What Cost?, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 161 (1988); Bonnie I.
Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborm A Return to Principled Interven-
tion, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745 (1990); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the
Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse", 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988).
176. See, eg., Tom Rickhoff & Cuasil Cukjati, Protecting the Fetus from Maternal Drug and
AlcoholAbuse" A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259 (1990); Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal
Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209
(1987).
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Civil child abuse laws have been extended to cover prenatal drug
use,17 7 and positive toxicology of newborns can result in a neglect deter-
mination.178 In a New York case, In re Fathima Ashanti KJ.,1 9 a child
tested positive for cocaine at birth and exhibited health problems associ-
ated with prenatal drug ingestion. 180 The court interpreted the state
abuse laws to include the unborn, and mandated judicial intervention for
protection of a newborn.
States have also turned to their criminal laws, albeit with mixed re-
sults, to prosecute fetal abuse arising from illegal drug use. In Illinois,
prosecutors pressed manslaughter charges against Melanie Green for al-
legedly using crack during her pregnancy that resulted in the death of
her baby. The grand jury would not return an indictment.18 1 In Florida,
however, a successful prosecution was brought against Jennifer Johnson.
Johnson was charged with delivery of an illegal substance to a minor.
The prosecutor argued that delivery occurred through the umbilical cord
immediately after birth.'8 2
Spending resources on civil neglect proceedings and prosecutions of
pregnant women for fetal abuse instead of on treatment for drug addic-
tion and prenatal care may not be the wisest public policy to insure the
health of newborns. But because states already forbid people from using
controlled substances, no autonomy rights are implicated in permitting
injured children to recover for injuries that result from their mothers'
gestational use of illegal drugs.
IV. CONCLUSION
As long as gestational surrogate arrangements remain a legal means
for infertile couples to acquire babies, the rights and responsibilities of
the parties must be clearly defined to avoid conflict and litigation. The
potential for psychological harm to all the parties involved should a sur-
rogate arrangement go awry is only exacerbated by vague legal rules with
indefinite outcomes. A bright-line rule that prohibits tort recovery for
injuries caused by legal maternal behavior would allow for predictable
177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a) (West Supp. 1990) (defining "harm" to include
drug dependency of newborn); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1990) (defining
"abused child" to include one who is "physically dependent upon an addictive drug at birth"); see
also supra note 6.
178. See In re Fathima Ashanti K., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Faro. Ct. 1990).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Isabel Wilkerson, Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in Drug Death of Newborn,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1989, at A10.
182. Tamar Lewin, Drug Use During Pregnancy: New Issue for the Courts, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 5,
1990, at A14.
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and fair results. It is true that some maternal behavior may cause injury
to a fetus, and traditional tort doctrine can be interpreted to create a
mother's duty to rescue a fetus because of the mother-fetus relationship.
However, imposing a duty of care on pregnant women, including gesta-
tional surrogate mothers, places too great a burden on women's auton-
omy. Making mothers the guarantors of fetal health would subordinate
their entire lives to the interests of a fetus, placing fetal interests above
the rights of women.
Disallowing actions in tort by the intended rearing parents on behalf
of injured children, except in cases of illegal activities, may chill the
number of surrogate agreements. Some potential genetic parents may
not want to assume the risk of any potential adverse consequences to the
fetus that result from maternal conduct. This is not only understandable,
but desirable. Intended rearing parents who enter into these arrange-
ments must recognize that they are dealing with women who have funda-
mental rights of autonomy and bodily integrity. To prevent women from
becoming mere fetal containers, the intended parents must assume the
risk that the gestational surrogate mother may exercise her rights in ways
that place her interests in conflict with theirs.
New technologies and the old desire for genetic children will contin-
ually draw some infertile couples toward gestational surrogacy. The law
must respond by treating gestational surrogate mothers just like other
pregnant women and by recognizing the autonomy rights of all pregnant
women.
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